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An Analysis of Johns-Manville Products Corp. v.
Superior Court: Recovery by an Employee
Against an Employer for Fraudulent Conduct
The California Supreme Court held in Johns-Manville Products
Corp. v: Superior CourtI that workers' compensation2 is an employee's
exclusive remedy for fraud3 committed by an employer, directed at the
employee, which results in a physical injury to the employee. Under
this holding, an employer in California may intentionally misrepresent
the safety of the work environment to his or her employees; the em-
ployee is precluded from seeking recovery for resulting injuries beyond
that provided by the workers' compensation scheme.
In Johns-Manville, an employer allegedly misrepresented to em-
ployees the safety of asbestos in the work environment. The employer
then allegedly made a second misrepresentation to the state, and to
doctors retained to treat the employees, that the level of employee ex-
posure to asbestos was below the maximum level prescribed by the
state. The court held that employees could recover at law for injuries
that were the result of the second misrepresentation to the state and to
the doctors,4 but that civil recovery for injuries that were the result of
the first misrepresentation to the employees was barred by the exclusiv-
1. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
2. Workers' compensation is in effect mandatory insurance on which employers pay
premiums for the benefit of their employees. An employer may obtain this insurance from
an authorized insurer, or an employer may elect, with the state's consent, to self-insure, in
which case the employer must deposit with the state a surety bond, securities, or cash suffi-
cient to secure potential liability. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3700, 3701 (West Supp. 1981).
In addition, the State Compensation Insurance Fund was established by the legislature
to provide workers' compensation insurance to the same extent as any other insurer. CAL.
INS. CODE § 11778 (West 1972). The state fund is self-supporting and is required, with
certain exceptions, to carry all applicants. The fund enables those employers who, for one
reason or another, cannot get insurance from private carriers to obtain adequate coverage.
See generally W. HANNA, 1 CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 2.04 (2d ed. 1981).
3. Employer fraud may be defined as a misrepresentation of a material fact by an
employer, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the intent that the employee rely
upon the misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 557A (1977).
This Comment discusses only employer fraud resulting in physical injuries. As nonphysical
injuries are not disabling and thus are noncompensable under the workers' compensation
scheme, at least one court has concluded that workers' compensation was not intended to
shield employers from liability for such injuries. See Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal.
App. 3d 883, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (employee allowed to seek damages in civil action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury).
4. 27 Cal. 3d at 477-79, 612 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
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ity provision of workers' compensation.5
This Comment first examines the structure of California's workers'
compensation system, and discusses the legislative history of Califor-
nia's workers' compensation laws and the case law prior to Johns-
Manville. Following an explanation of the court's opinion, the Com-
ment criticizes Johns-Manville and suggests alternative interpretations
of California's workers' compensation laws- and their rationale. The
Comment concludes that employer fraud that results in personal injury
to an employee arising in the course and scope of employment should
be compensable both through the workers' compensation scheme and
through the courts,6 and that a set-off should be allowed for the admin-
istrative award.7
The California Workers' Compensation System
California's workers' compensation system provides for monetary
compensation to an employee whose injury arises out of and in the
course and scope of employment.8 An employee need not show negli-
gence9 on the part of the employer to recover.10 On the other hand, an
employee is precluded from pursuing a civil action for damages flowing
from the injury, because of the exclusivity provision of the workers'
compensation law. 1
5. Id. at 474-75, 612 P.2d at 953-54, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64; see CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3601 (West Supp. 1981).
6. For a discussion of the merits of employee choice of remedies, see 2A A. LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 67.22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LARSON];
Comment, Intentional Employer Torts: A Matter for the Calfornia Legislature, 15 U.S.F.L.
REv. 651 (1981).
7. Such a set-off was allowed in Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d
810, - Cal. Rptr. - (1982). Intentional torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, see Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978),
and assault and battery, see Magliulio v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr.
621 (1975), have provided a basis for civil recovery despite the exclusivity provision. See
generally Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court: The Not-So-Exclusive
Remedy Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263 (1981). The doctrine of dual capacity permits actions at
law against employers who deal with employees in a second capacity based on the independ-
ent duties and liabilities of one who assumes that capacity. See Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d
781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1981).
9. Ordinary negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct
recklessly disregardful of an interest of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282
(1965).
10. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1981). Liability will not arise under the work-
ers' compensation scheme, however, if injury results from an employee's use of alcohol or
drugs, from self-infliction, or from a fight in which the injured employee is the aggressor.
Id.
11. Id. § 3601 (West Supp. 1981); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27
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Under the workers' compensation scheme, the employer is re-
quired to pay premiums to the compensation fund for the benefit of the
employee.' 2 Compensation to an employee is available for lost wages
and medical expenses under the workers' compensation law,13 but not
for pain and suffering or punitive damages. 14 This limitation exists be-
cause workers' compensation was not intended to compensate a worker
completely, but rather to make him or her well enough to return to
employment.' 5 Moreover, benefits are fixed at an employee's wage
level at the time of the injury.' 6
Additional compensation is available to an employee in cases of
"serious and willful" 17 misconduct by the employer under section 4553
of the California Labor Code.'8 An employee who has suffered an in-
jury as a result of such employer misconduct may apply to the Work-
ers' Compensation Appeals Board for a sum equal to one-half of the
workers' compensation award, but not to exceed $10,000.19 This award
is intended only as extra compensation, not as punitive damages.20 The
availability of section 4553 awards has had a deterrent effect upon egre-
gious employer conduct because an employer cannot insure against the
Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Employers originally thought that
workers' compensation would turn out to be expensive and they opposed it.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. 2A LARSON, supra note 6, at § 65.20; see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4600-4605, 4659
(West 1971 & Supp. 1981).
14. "As for physical pain and suffering, unless it interferes with earning capacity, no
allowance can be made in a compensation award; nevertheless, a common-law suit for pain
and suffering for a work-connected injury will not lie." 2A LARSON, supra note 6, at § 65.20.
15. See Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 30 Cal. Rptr. 407,
414 (1963) (purpose of workmen's compensation is to rehabilitate, not to indemnify).
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4453 (West Supp. 1981).
17. The Restatement equates "wanton and willful" misconduct with "recklessness" and
defines recklessness as when the actor "does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it
is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary
to make his conduct negligent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The Re-
statement does not define "gross negligence," but refers the reader to "recklessness."
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981): "The amount of compensation other-
wise recoverable shall be increased one-half where the employee is injured by reason of the
serious and willful misconduct of any of the following:
"(a) The employer, or his managing representative ....
"(c) If the employer is a corporation, on the part of an executive, managing officer, or
general superintendent thereof.
"But such increase of award shall in no event exceed... $10,000; together with costs
and expenses incident to the procurement of such awards, not to exceed ... $250."
19. d.
20. E. Clemons Horst Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 180, 192-93, 193 P. 105,
110 (1920); see also Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 478 n. 12,
612 P.2d at 956 n.12, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866 n.12.
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award.2' Serious and willful employer misconduct that warrants a sec-
tion 4553 award, however, may be difficult to prove.22
By contrast, the civil system allows full compensation for physical
injuries caused by an employer's tortious conduct, including awards for
pain and suffering, and punitive damages.23 Civil judgments, however,
are not granted as swiftly as administrative workers' compensation
awards, and the employee must prove some tortious conduct to recover.
Nevertheless, as civil remedies are broader in scope and may be set at a
rate higher than that of worker's compensation, the civil system may
have a greater deterrent effect upon potential tortfeasors.24
Legislative History
Three sets of workers' compensation statutes have been enacted in
California: the Roseberry Act of 1911,25 the Boynton Act of 1913,26
and the current law, the Workers' Compensation Insurance and Safety
Act of 1917.27 The Roseberry Act and the Boynton Act permitted em-
ployees to elect a civil remedy for injuries caused by an employer's
gross negligence or willful misconduct. 28 Those Acts, therefore, pro-
vided that workers' compensation would be the exclusive remedy for
employee injuries that arose through no fault of the employer or that
were the result of ordinary negligence by the employer, but permitted a
civil remedy for more serious employer misconduct.
The Workers' Compensation Insurance and Safety Act, passed in
21. Although insurance may cover the cost of defending a "serious and willful" action,
including attorneys' fees for both the original adjudication and appellate proceedings, it
cannot cover the $10,000 fine. CAL. INS. CODE § 11661 (West 1972).
22. See, e.g., American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 79
Cal. App. 3d 615, 622-23, 144 Cal. Rptr. 898, 902 (1978) (when an employer is unaware of
any previous machinery mishaps, no serious and willful misconduct will lie).
23. The following damages are compensable civilly: past and future physical and
mental pain, past and future medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, permanent disabil-
ity, permanent disfigurement, and loss of consortium. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, §§ 901-932 (1979). Of the above, only past and present medical expenses
are available through workers' compensation. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4600-4605 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1981); see also id § 3209.
24. "[The workers' compensation] system balances the advantage to the employer of
immunity from liability at law against the detriment of relatively swift and certain compen-
sation payments. Conversely, while the employee receives expeditious compensation, he
surrenders his right to a potentially larger recovery in a common law action for the negli-
gence or willful misconduct of his employer." Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior
Court, 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
25. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 399, at 796 (repealed 1913).
26. 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 176, at 279 (amended 1917).
27. 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, at 831 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-
4386 (West 1971 & Supp. 1981)).
28. Boynton Act, 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 176, § 12(b), at 279, 283; Roseberry Act, 1911 Cal.
Stat. ch. 399, § 3, at 796.
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1917, provided that awards made under workers' compensation consti-
tuted an employee's exclusive remedy for injuries arising in the course
and scope of employment.2 9 The right of an employee to bring a civil
action in the event of the employer's gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct was omitted. The 1917 Act instead provided for a fifty percent
increase in compensation when an employer's "serious and willful"
misconduct resulted in the employee's injury.30 Exemplary damages
were not provided for in the 1917 Act.31
Case Law
The first California Supreme Court case to interpret section 4553,
the "serious and willful" provision, was E. Clemons Horst Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission.32 In Horst, one of the employee's duties
was to keep a potato slicer unclogged. The employee was injured by
the slicer as she attempted to fix it. The Industrial Accident Commis-
sion granted a section 4553 award against the employer, finding that its
failure to maintain a safe workplace constituted serious and willful
misconduct. The employer appealed, claiming that section 4553
awards were intended only for intentional tortious misconduct.
The California Supreme Court upheld the Commission's award,
holding that there need not be proof of actual knowledge on the part of
the employer of a dangerous condition for serious and willful miscon-
duct to exist.33 The court stated that "serious" misconduct is "conduct
which the employer either knew, or ought to have known, if he had
turned his mind to the matter, to be conduct likely to jeopardize the
safety of his employees," 34 and that such misconduct is "willful" if "the
circumstances surrounding the act of commission or omission are such
as 'evince a reckless disregard for the safety of others and a willingness
to inflict the injury complained of.' ,,35
Thus, employer misconduct similar to gross negligence or reckless-
ness is "serious and willful misconduct." The Horst court, however,
did not state whether intentional torts would also be classified as seri-
ous and willful misconduct.
29. Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act, 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 586,
§ 6(b), at 831, 834 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1981)).
30. Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act, 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 586,
§ 6(b), at 831, 834 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1981)).
31. Doubts were expressed about the absence of a choice of remedies in the new
worker's compensation system. See Note,, Workmen's CompensationAct: Serious and Wiful
Misconduct of Employer, 9 CALIF. L. Rnv. 352 (1921).
32. 184 Cal. 180, 193 P. 105 (1920).
33. Id. at 188-89, 193 P. at 108-09.
34. Id. at 189, 193 P. at 108.
35. Id. at 189, 193 P. at 109 (quoting Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. v. Bryan, 107 Ind. 51, 53,
7 N.E. 807, 808 (1886)).
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In Mercer-Fraser Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission ,36 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court seemed to expand the definition of serious and
willful misconduct to include intentional torts. 37 In Mercer-Fraser, a
contractor had failed to erect enough sway lines to prevent a building
from collapsing. When the building collapsed, several employees were
killed. Although the contractor had been warned that the winds at the
time of the accident were extraordinarily strong, the court found that
the contractor was only negligent and therefore denied the plaintiff a
section 4553 award.
The Mercer-Fraser court defined serious and willful misconduct as
conduct that
necessarily involves deliberate, intentional, or wanton conduct in do-
ing or omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation of
the fact, on the part of the culpable person, that danger is likely to
result therefrom.
Willfulness necessarily involves the performance of a deliberate
or intentional act or omission regardless of the consequences. 38
As the employer in Mercer-Fraser was only negligent, it had committed
no serious and willful misconduct, as defined either by this court or by
the Horst court. Thus, the Mercer-Fraser court's expansion of the
Horst definition to include intentional torts is merely dictum.
In Magliulio v. Superior Court,39 the California Court of Appeal
applied the Horst definition to conclude that "'serious and willful mis-
conduct' is that which falls between ordinary negligence and an inten-
tional act."'40 In Magliulio, an employee brought a civil suit against her
employer for an alleged workplace assault and battery, seeking com-
pensatory and punitive damages. The court concluded that the exclu-
sivity provision of the California workers' compensation system did not
bar a civil suit if the employer "personally intentionally inflicts an in-
jury on the person of his employee."' 4' As the court construed section
4553 awards to be available only for misconduct falling between ordi-
nary negligence and an intentional act, and as punitive damages may
be awarded for an oppressive or malicious assault,42 the court con-
cluded that "the Legislature did not intend the provisions now found in
section 4553 to be a substitute for the relief which could be afforded for
an intentional assault. '43
36. 40 Cal. 2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953).
37. Id. at 124-26, 251 P.2d at 967-68.
38. Id. at 117, 251 P.2d at 962 (quoting Porter v. Hofmann, 12 Cal. 2d 445, 447-48, 85
P.2d 447, 448 (1938)) (emphasis in original).
39. 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
40. Id. at 778-779, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
41. Id. at 769, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
42. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3244 (West Supp. 1981).
43. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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It is uncertain, however, whether the reasoning of Magliulio can be
extended to other employer intentional torts, such as fraudulent con-
cealment of workplace hazards. The question is whether such torts are
so related to the employment as to be covered by workers' compensa-
tion. Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for workplace in-
juries "proximately'caused by the employment." 44 In holding that civil
suits for intentional employer misconduct are not barred, the Magliulo
court relied, in part, on its conclusion that "an intentional assault...
is of questionable relationship to general conditions of employment." 45
Prior to Johns-Manville, only two California cases considered the
relationship of employer concealment of workplace hazards to workers'
compensation, and the question whether an employee could bring a
civil suit against an employer for concealment of workplace hazards.
In Buttner v. American Bell Telephone Co. ,46 the employer allegedly
misrepresented the nature of carbon tetrachloride, a hazardous sub-
stance, to an employee who was subsequently injured by the substance.
The court held that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy
for all physical injuries arising out of and in the course and scope of
employment, "irrespective of the manner in which they might occur. ' 47
The court noted that section: 4553 provided additional compensation
for serious and willful misconduct.48
In Wright v. FMC Corp. ,9 an employee charged his employer with
concealment and misrepresentation of the hazards of chemicals used in
the workplace. In a three-paragraph opinion, the court relied solely on
Buttner to hold that the employee was limited to his workers' compen-
sation remedy. 50
Thus, prior to Johns-Manville, courts held that employer conceal-
ment of workplace hazards fell within the scope of the workers' com-
pensation system. Under this analysis, employer concealment of
workplace hazards, although an intentional tort, is covered by workers'
compensation and section 4553; civil suits are barred.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court
In Johns-Manville, an employee sought civil recovery for an indus-
trial disease 51 incurred as a result of exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff,
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(c) (West Supp. 1981); see id. § 3601.
45. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 635; see also Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 495, 498, 233 P.2d 612, 614 (1951).
46. 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940).
47. Id. at 584, 107 P.2d at 441.
48. Id.
49. 81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1978).
50. Id. at 779, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
51. "Industrial diseases" are infirmities that result from exposure to a hazardous sub-
stance, such as asbestos.
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Reba Rudkin, a Johns-Manville employee for twenty-nine years, al-
leged as the initial fraud that the defendant company knew of the dan-
gerous effects of asbestos, chose to expose its employees to asbestos
regardless of this knowledge, and then misrepresented to its employees
that the carcinogen was harmless. In addition, Rudkin alleged as a
second fraud that Johns-Manville "fraudulently concealed from him,
and from the doctors retained to treat him, as well as from the state,
that he was suffering from a disease caused by ingestion of asbestos,
thereby preventing him from receiving treatment for the disease and
inducing him to continue working under hazardous conditions."5 2
Rudkin sought compensatory and punitive damages for his physi-
cal injuries. 53 Johns-Manville moved for a judgment on the pleadings,
asserting that the action was barred by Labor Code section 3601, 54
which makes workers' compensation the exclusive remedy for work-
related injuries. The lower court let the plaintiffs complaint stand, and
the employer then petitioned for a writ of mandate setting aside the
trial court's order.55
The California Supreme Court agreed with Johns-Manville in
part, ruling that, as a matter of law, the employer was not liable in a
civil action for the injuries that resulted from the initial fraud.56 The
court held, however, that Rudkin did state a cause of action for that
portion of the injury that resulted from the second fraud, the com-
pany's alleged concealment of the nature and cause of Rudkin's condi-
tion.57 The court stated that, had the defendant merely "concealed
from [the plaintiff] that his health was endangered by asbestos in the
work environment, failed to supply adequate protective devices to
avoid disease, and violated governmental regulations relating to dust
levels at the plant, plaintiffs only remedy would be to prosecute his
claim under the workers' compensation law."5 8
In reaching its decision, the court gave considerable weight to its
interpretation of the legislative intent of California's workers' compen-
sation law. 59 Noting that section 4553 was added to the workers' com-
pensation laws at the same time that the employee's choice of remedies
52. 27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
53. Id. at 469-70, 612 P.2d at 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
54. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1981).
55. Rudkin died of lung cancer shortly after the petition for writ of mandate was filed,
but the issues presented were not rendered moot because, as the supreme court noted, "an
action for personal injuries survives the death of the plaintiff." Id. at 470, 612 P.2d at 951,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
56. Id. at 474, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
57. Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
58. Id. at 475-76, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
59. "In sum, the provisions of section 4553 were designed to penalize intentional mis-
conduct of an employer, and the injuries which result from such acts are compensable under
that section." Id. at 473, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
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was deleted,60 the court concluded that these changes were intended to
eliminate civil compensation for all work-related employee injuries.
The section 4553 award for the serious and willful misconduct of the
employer "was a substitute for the previous right of an employee to
bring an action at law."' 61 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that serious and willful misconduct did not include intentional miscon-
duct. Relying upon Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion,62 the court found that intentional misconduct was included in
section 4553, and held that the initial fraud, an intentional tort, was
compensable exclusively under workers' compensation. 63
Despite its refusal in Johns-Manville to permit a civil recovery for
the initial fraud, the court did allow an exception to the exclusivity of
workers' compensation for the second "aggravating" fraud.64 Holding
that Rudkin did state a cause of action at law for this injury, the court
justified the exception on several grounds. First, the court noted that
permitting an action at law only for aggravation of an industrial dis-
ease through employer fraud, as opposed to permitting civil recovery
for all injuries caused by employer fraud, would not "open up a Pan-
dora's box of actions at law seeking damages for numerous industrial
diseases" because actions for such aggravating fraud would not be
numerous.
65
Second, the court noted that the injury occurring as a result of the
secondary fraud was actually an "aggravation of the disease, as distinct
from the hazards of the employment which caused [the plaintiff] to
60. See notes 25-31 & accompanying text supra.
61. Id. at 472, 612 P.2d at 952, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
62. 40 Cal. 2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953).
63. 27 Cal. 3d at 472-73, 612 P.2d at 952-53, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
64. Id. at 475-78, 612 P.2d at 954-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864-66. Justice Clark dissented
in Johns-Manville, stating that no exception to the rule of exclusivity should be allowed. He
argued that allowing recovery would discourage employers from retaining physicians, be-
cause they would be held liable for failing to give their physicians information about the
hazards of the workplace. Id. at 480, 612 P.2d at 957, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). He maintained that the employee must fit within one of the statutory exemp-
tions to maintain an action at law. Id. at 482, 612 P.2d at 959, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 868. He
further argued that the previous exceptions to the exclusivity rule of workers' compensation
concerning an employee's ability to recover in a civil suit for a work-related assault and
battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, see note 7 supra, were based on the
statutory language of the workers' compensation laws. Id. at 485, 612 P.2d at 960, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 870. Justice Clark explained that the assault and battery exception was justified by
California Labor Code § 3601(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981), which allows an employee to bring
an action at law for a work-related assault and battery committed by a co-employee. Id. He
explained the intentional infliction of emotional distress exception by reasoning that the lack
of a workers' compensation remedy for purely nonphysical injuries implied an exception to
the exclusivity rule for torts that result in a nonphysical injury. Id. at 485-86, 612 P.2d at
960-61, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
65. 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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contract the disease. '66 The court relied on Unruh v. Truck Insurance
Exchange67 for the proposition that the intentional aggravation of an
industrial injury is compensable at law.
Third, the Johns-Manville court noted that the employee could not
have "contemplated" the aggravating fraud on the part of the em-
ployer.68 The court reasoned that, if an employee cannot contemplate
an injury at the time employment commences, the employee does not
surrender his or her right to bring an action at law for that injury
merely by accepting employment.69 The court, however, did not ad-
dress the issue whether an employee can be expected to contemplate
that an employer would perpetrate the initial fraud that resulted in
physical injury.
Finally, the Johns-Manville court cited the "blameworthiness" of
the defendant's actions as a reason for allowing civil recovery for the
aggravation of an injury by employer fraud. Characterizing the alleged
secondary fraud as "blameworthy," "egregious," and "flagrant," the
court indicated that such conduct violates public policy and therefore
should be discouraged through the threat of punitive damages.70 Thus,
the court justified this exception to the exclusive remedy rule.71
Johns-Manville's Analysis of Legislative Intent
The California Supreme Court's basis for concluding in Johns-
Manville that the legislature intended for intentional torts committed
by employers to be covered exclusively by workers' compensation was
that the legislature deleted the employee's choice of remedies to redress
an injury caused by the employer's gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct when it adopted section 4553.72 The court did not adequately con-
sider the possibility that the legislature intended that section 4553 be
the exclusive remedy only for grossly negligent or reckless misconduct,
and that employees still be able to maintain a private right of action for
intentional employer misconduct.
The key factor in deciding whether the legislature intended that a
civil remedy be allowed for intentional employer torts is whether the
legislature failed to include a remedy within the workers' compensation
system and thereby implied, by omission, a civil remedy. The issue
66. Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
67. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
68. 27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
69. Id.
70. The court indicated that the defendant's second fraud in this case was more blame-
worthy than that of the defendant in Unruh. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
866.
71. Id.
72. 27 Cal. 3d at 471-72, 612 P.2d at 951-52, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
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thus becomes whether the legislature intended the "serious and willful"
awards of section 4553 to provide a remedy for intentional torts.
The exclusive remedy provision of California workers' compensa-
tion law, California Labor Code section 3601, provides that, when the
conditions for recovery of workers' compensation, are met, such com-
pensation will be "the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an em-
ployee against an employer." 73 This broad exclusivity rule must be
read, however, in conjunction with section 3600, which describes the
conditions of workers' compensation, and provides in part:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of
any other liability whatsoever to any person except as provided in
section 3706, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an em-
ployer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of and in
the course and scope of employment .... 4
The legislature is authorized by article XIV, section 4 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution to provide for workers' compensation "irrespective
of the fault of any party."75 Had the legislature intended that inten-
tional torts be compensable exclusively under the workers' compensa-
tion system, it could have specified that workers' compensation would
be the exclusive remedy for employee injury "without regard to fault."
Section 3600 does not refer to intentional tortious misconduct on the
part of the employer, and its express reference to employer negligence
implies that the legislature intended that workers' compensation would
not be the exclusive remedy for intentional employer misconduct.
The Johns-Manville court concluded that the legislature intended
section 4553, the serious and willful misconduct provision, to be an em-
ployee's sole remedy for intentional employer misconduct.76 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court relied on dicta from Mercer-Fraser Co. v.
IndustrialAccident Commission,77 which interpreted "serious and will-
ful misconduct" to include deliberate, intentional, and wanton
conduct.78
The Johns-Manville court, however, failed to consider the court's
definition of serious and willful misconduct in E. Clemens Horst Co. v.
IndustrialAccident Commission,79 which implied that serious and will-
ful misconduct included only gross negligence and recklessness.80 Al-
73. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1981).
74. Id. § 3600 (emphasis added).
75. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (formerly art. XX, § 21); see Matthews v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 719, 728-36, 493 P.2d 1165, 1170-76, 100 Cal. Rptr. 301, 306-
12 (1972).
76. 27 Cal. 3d at 472-73, 612 P.2d at 952-53, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
77. 40 Cal. 2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953).
78. Id. at 117, 251 P.2d at 962. See notes 36-38 & accompanying text supra.
79. 184 Cal. 180, 193 P. 105 (1920).
80. Id. at 188-89, 193 P. at 108-09. See notes 32-35 & accompanying text supra.
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though Horst did not expressly state that serious and willful
misconduct did not include intentional torts, its discussion referred
only to negligent and reckless conduct. Horst was decided in 1920,
only three years after the enactment of California's present workers'
compensation law.81 As there are no surviving records of legislative
hearings, 82 Horst's definition of the scope of the serious and willful
misconduct provision should be accorded substantial weight.
If the Horst definition of serious and willful misconduct were
adopted, then section 4553 would provide a remedy only for grossly
negligent or reckless misconduct. Intentional misconduct would not be
included. Thus, an employee still could pursue a private right of action
for intentional misconduct.
Reliance on Case Law
The court in Johns-Manville relied on Buttner v. American Bell Tel-
ephone Co. 83 and Wright v. FMC Corp. 84 for the proposition that civil
recovery against an employer for fraudulent concealment and misrep-
resentation of workplace hazards is barred by the exclusivity provision
of the workers' compensation law.85 As the plaintiff in Buttner sought
only compensatory damages, however, the Buttner court expressly de-
clined to decide whether, despite the exclusivity rule, an employee
might be allowed to bring a civil action for punitive or exemplary dam-
ages.86 Buttner referred to the discussion of punitive damages in E
Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission.87 In Horst, the
California Supreme Court concluded that punitive damages could not
constitutionally be awarded under the workers' compensation law, but
indicated that the legislature could provide for employee recovery of
punitive damages in legal actions. 88 Thus, Buttner and Horst left open
the possibility that an employee could sue an employer at law for puni-
tive damages for injuries sustained as a result of an employer's fraudu-
lent conduct.
The plaintiff in Johns-Manville sought to recover punitive damages
from his employer. Relying on Buttner, the Johns-Manville court stated
that civil recovery for employer fraud is barred. This reliance is mis-
placed because Buttner held only that compensation, not punitive dam-
ages, is recoverable exclusively within workers' compensation. As
81. See notes 25-31 & accompanying text supra.
82. See D. HENKE, CALIFORNIA LAW GUIDE § 4.32 (2d ed. 1976).
83. 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940).
84. 81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974).
85. 27 Cal. 3d at 473-74, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
86. 41 Cal. App. 2d at 585, 107 P.2d at 443.
87. 184 Cal. 180, 193 P. 105 (1920).
88. Id. at 192, 193 P. at I 10.
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Wright relied only on Buttner to support the same proposition, 89
Wright also provides little precedent for Johns-Manville.
Another example of the Johns-Manville court's misplaced reliance
on precedent is its use of Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange90 to sup-
port the proposition that only the aggravation of an industrial injury
caused by fraudulent conduct is compensable at law. The Johns-
Manville court stated that allegations made by the plaintiff that he was
suffering from a disease because of his employer's misrepresentations
to a third party were "sufficient to state a cause of action for aggrava-
tion of the disease, as distinct from the hazards of the employment
which caused him to contract the disease."9'
In Unruh, the plaintiff was "befriended" by an investigator for the
employer's insurance company, who had been hired to get pictures of
the plaintiff that would show that she was not as severely injured as she
claimed. The investigator took the plaintiff to Disneyland, where he
violently shook a rope bridge upon which she was standing while a
confederate surreptitiously photographed her. When these photo-
graphs were produced at her workers' compensation hearing, the plain-
tiff suffered severe emotional distress. She sued her employer's insurer
for damages for the distress. The court held that, although an em-
ployer's insurer generally may not be sued at law as a "person other
than the employer" for purposes of workers' compensation, 92 this in-
jury was distinct from the plaintiffs industrial injury and therefore was
compensable in a civil action.93
Although the Unruh court drew a distinction between hazards of
employment that result from intentional tortious conduct on the part of
the employer and hazards that result from later employer conduct, Un-
ruh involved the occurrence of two separate and distinct injuries. In
Johns-Manville, on the other hand, one continuous injury resulted from
the fraud. In Unruh the aggravating injury was separate and distinct
from the original injury, was caused outside of employment hours, and
was inflicted for reasons different from those for which the original in-
jury had been inflicted. In Johns-Manville, however, the "aggravating
injury" was merely a continuation of the original injury. In addition,
the aggravating injury was caused with the same intent as the original
injury-to conceal the danger of asbestos. As it would be difficult to
separate the injuries in Johns-Manville and as the injuries arose out of
89. See notes 49-50 & accompanying text supra.
90. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
91. 27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
92. 7 Cal. 3d at 627, 498 P.2d at 1071, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 823. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852
(West 1971) provides: "The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his claim
or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from such injury or death as against
any person other than the employer."
93. 7 Cal. 3d at 630, 498 P.2d at 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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the same transaction and with an identical ill intent, the employee
should be able to seek redress for the entire injury in an action at law.
Criteria for Civil Recovery
The Johns-Manville opinion set forth certain criteria for civil re-
covery, relying on false assumptions concerning the employer-em-
ployee relationship. These criteria are inadequate to protect an
employee from an employer's intentional tortious conduct.
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff could recover for the
second fraud, the Johns-Manville court reasoned that "it is inconceiv-
able that plaintiff contemplated [that the] defendant would. . . inten-
tionally conceal the knowledge that he had contracted a serious disease
from the work environment, thereby aggravating the disease, and [that]
by accepting employment he would surrender his right to damages at
law for such conduct."' 94 By denying recovery to Rudkin for the initial
fraud, which was a conscious failure to warn Rudkin of the dangers of
the environment, the court implied that employees may be held to con-
template at the time they accept employment that their employers
might conceal from them hidden dangers of the work environment.
Employees, however, do not reasonably contemplate that employers
will conceal knowledge of hidden dangers. A more realistic assump-
tion is that an employer will notify employees and protect them against
latent dangers that may present serious hazards to health.
Another weakness of the Johns-Manville opinion is that the court
did not distinguish between a failure to ensure a safe workplace and an
intentional concealment of workplace hazards.95 The failure to ensure
a safe work environment may involve only a negligent omission or lack
of awareness. Even a "deliberate failure" 96 to ensure safety is not con-
sidered an intentional tort.97 A deliberate misrepresentation or con-
cealment of hazards, however, involves the intentional torts of fraud
and deceit. The court should have made this distinction and consid-
ered the possible consequences that would flow from it.
The court could have distinguished the failure to ensure safety
from the misrepresentation of hazards, allowing civil recovery for the
latter, more serious conduct.98 Employers should not be shielded from
civil liability for misrepresenting and concealing workplace hazards.
94. 27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
95. See id. at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
96. Id.
97. See 2A LARSON, supra note 6, at § 68.13. The court of appeal reversed a jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff in Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 810, - Cal.
Rptr.- (1982), relying exclusively on Johns-Manville. The employer in Williams was aware
of the dangerous condition of its sawdust piles. These piles spontaneously combusted, injur-
ing the employee. The court denied recovery to the employee, citing Johns-Manville.
98. Many states built their workers' compensation systems around the concept of "acci-
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The Johns-Manville court justified its exception to the exclusivity
provision by noting the blameworthiness of the employer's conduct. 99
This justification, however, is equally applicable to other tortious con-
duct of an employer. The court attempted to distinguish the blamewor-
thiness of Johns-Manville's second fraud on the ground that it was
more serious than the employer's conduct in Unruh, in which the de-
fendant insurance company, in investigating a claim of industrial in-
jury, committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.'0  In Johns-Manville, the court determined that Johns-
Manville's conduct in committing the second fraud, as alleged in the
complaint, was so "egregious and the societal interest in deterring simi-
lar conduct in the future is so great that there is justification for award-
ing punitive damages."' 0 1
Although it is difficult to rank "blameworthy" acts by degrees of
culpability, the court's distinction among the employer's alleged initial
fraud in Johns-Manville, the acts alleged in Unruh, and the second
fraud in Johns-Manville is inadequate. The court's characterization of
the second fraud as "blameworthy," "egregious," and "flagrant' 0 2 of-
fers no meaningful standard for distinguishing the initial fraud from
the second fraud. If, however, blameworthiness of conduct is to be the
benchmark for allowing a recovery at law, then a civil recovery should
be allowed for the initial fraudulent action in Johns-Manville because it
was substantially more culpable than many actions that have resulted
only in a section 4553 award. For example, the court in Rogers Mate-
rial Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission'03 awarded a "serious and
willful" misconduct award against an employer who told an employee
not to wash a cement truck in motion, but who failed to discipline the
employee for violating that rule. The court in Erickson v. Workmens'
Compensation Appeals Board1°4 also granted a section 4553 "serious
and willful" award against an employer who posted a warning to em-
ployees not to clean certain machines while they were moving. When
an employee was injured while cleaning a machine in motion, the court
granted the award, noting that an employer is guilty of willful miscon-
duct when his or her actions demonstrate "that he deliberately failed to
act for the safety of his employees, knowing that his failure would
probably result in injury to them."105
dental injury" allowing civil recovery when there is premeditation or scienter on the part of
the tortfeasor. See 2A LARSON, supra note 6, at § 65.10.




103. 63 Cal. 2d 717, 408 P.2d 737, 48 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1965).
104. 12 Cal. App. 3d 388, 90 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1970).
105. Id. at 394, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
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The conduct in Rogers and Erickson, classified by those courts as
"serious and willful," is less culpable than the employer misconduct
involved in Johns-Manville. These situations both involve obvious
dangers, of which the workers had notice. In effect, California courts
have been granting "serious and willful" misconduct awards for acts of
employer gross negligence.' 0 6 In denying civil recovery for the initial
fraud of misrepresenting the nature of asbestos to its employees, the
Johns-Manville court limited the employee's recovery to a section 4553
award at most. The court granted the same remedy for the intentional
tort of fraud, which the employer can consciously cause or prevent, as it
did for the negligent and grossly negligent torts described in Rogers
and Erickson, which the employer did not consciously commit. As an
employer has control over the commission of an intentional tort such as
fraud, it is inconsistent and inequitable that employer fraud be given
the same treatment by the law as mere gross negligence.10 7
Public Policy and Economic Reasons for Civil Recovery
Public policy considerations also favor a result different from the
one reached by the Johns-Manville court. The workers' compensation
system cannot remedy intentional torts, because of its inability fully to
compensate employees. Under workers' compensation, only medical
expenses and lost wages are compensable.10 8 This limitation is particu-
larly harsh when an employee's injury was caused by the intentional
tort of employer fraud. Although an employer who committed fraud
might be subject to the section 4553 award for "serious and willful"
misconduct, that award is limited to $10,000, an amount that may be
far less than the civil damages otherwise available to the plaintiff.10 9
Permitting a civil recovery in addition to the more expeditious
workers' compensation remedy would more fully compensate an em-
ployee whose injury was caused by the tortious misconduct of the em-
ployer in those situations in which the employer's deliberate acts
determined whether the injury would occur.110 Moreover, requiring
106. See notes 9, 17 supra.
107. Employers and employees should be treated equally. "A much more lenient atti-
tude has been taken toward the conduct of employers in their disregard of the safety of their
workers than toward the worker's disregard of his own security." Note, Serious and Wilful
Misconduct Clauses of California Workmen's Compensation Act, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 432, 436
(1934).
108. See notes 13-15 & accompanying text supra.
109. See 2A LARSON, supra note 6, at § 65.20.
110. This "cumulative remedy" approach was rejected in Williams v. International Pa-
per Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 810, - Cal. Rptr. - (1982). In theory at least, it is assumed that
employees bargain for the safety of the work environment. Dangerous work environments
require higher pay. When an employer misrepresents workplace safety conditions, an em-
ployee is likely to settle for a lower wage. To make such a decision, an employee must have
accurate information. If the hazard is too risky for the wage offered, the employee should be
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employers to compensate employees for injuries occurring in the work-
place may reduce the number of injuries that occur.",
Although the Johns-Manville court stated that the current system
has achieved a "delicate balance" between the cost of workers' com-
pensation to the employers and the benefits to the employees," 2 the
workers' compensation system, as construed in Johns-Manjiille, may tip
the scales in favor of the fraudulent employer, because honest employ-
ers who maintain safe equipment and working conditions arguably
bear the economic burden of other employers' fraud in the form of
higher insurance premiums. As the state imposes a maximum rate on
workers' compensation premiums, 13 the rates of the employers with no
workers' compensation claims for fraudulent conduct are increased to
help pay the claims of defrauded employees who have suffered in-
jury." 4 In addition, to the extent that one purpose of the workers' com-
pensation system is to protect employers from excessive liability, that
protection should be forfeited when the employer acts egregiously to
defraud an employee and causes a serious injury.
Another public policy consideration that favors allowing civil re-
covery for an employer's fraudulent conduct is that such recoveries
may have the effect of deterring that conduct. Because of the limited
scope of compensation provided by a workers' compensation award,
the award may have little deterrent effect on employers who choose to
commit fraud against their employees rather than to take the steps nec-
essary to make the workplace adequately safe. This problem is particu-
larly acute when the section 4553 award is less than the cost of
maintaining a safe work environment. Although these awards are paid
by the employer and cannot be insured against, section 4553 awards are
limited to $10,000.
free to refuse employment. An employer who conceals a workplace hazard pays an em-
ployee less than the employee otherwise would ask; thus, the employer retains the salary that
he or she would otherwise pay.
111. See Culbertson & Woods, Charge Total Casualy Claims Cost Against the Operating
Unit's Prft, 49 HARv. Bus. Rnv. 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1981).
112. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
113. CAL. INS. CODE § 1173.1 (West 1972).
114. The effect of the limitation on employer liability under workers' compensation is to
turn the issue of industrial safety into a matter of economics. This would not be the case if a
civil remedy were available.
The disincentives to maintaining a safe work environment could be alleviated to some
extent by removing the statutory ceiling on workers' compensation insurance premiums.
Merely lifting the lid on premiums would put out of business those employers who are run-
ning dangerous operations. Increasing premiums for an excessive number of accidents also
works to make it costly for employers to maintain a hazardous condition. Unfortunately,
merely lifting the ceiling on insurance premiums does not compensate the victimized em-
ployee; it only disposes of the economic argument against California's present workers' com-
pensation system.
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Conclusion
California law provides an inadequate remedy for victims of em-
ployer fraud that results in injury to an employee. The court in Johns-
Manville held that, if an employer intentionally misrepresents to an
employee the safety of the workplace, the victim of the misrepresenta-
tion is limited to a workers' compensation remedy. Workers' compen-
sation does not allow for full compensation or punitive damages, but
only for lost wages and medical expenses, and is limited by the em-
ployee's wage level at the time of the accident.
Johns-Manville failed to give adequate consideration to the possi-
bility that the legislature did not intend that employee-victims of em-
ployer fraud be limited to the workers' compensation remedy. The
court also failed to distinguish employer failure to ensure a safe work-
place from employer misrepresentation and concealment of workplace
hazards. The court allowed recovery for the second aggravating fraud,
but failed to offer adequate reasons for allowing recovery only for the
second fraud.
Public policy and economic considerations favor allowing civil re-
covery for employer fraud, with a set-off for the worker's compensation
award. The deterrent effect of workers' compensation is not as great as
that of the civil system. Moreover, affording an employer protection
from civil liability may provide an economic incentive to employers to
defraud employees rather than to maintain a safe work environment.
Thus, employer fraud that results in a physical injury to an employee
should be compensable at law.
Cynthia K. Thornton*
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